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Abstract
We examine firms’ strategic incentives to engage in horizontal mergers. In a real options frame-
work, we show that strategic considerations may explain abnormally high takeover activity during
periods of positive and negative demand shocks. Importantly, this pattern emerges solely as a
result of firms’ strategic interaction in output markets and holds in the absence of technological
and financial reasons for merging. Varying the intensity of product market competition and the
industry structure, and allowing for the existence of operating synergies, operating leverage, and
merger-related costs generates additional empirical implications. We test the main predictions of
the model using parametric and semi-parametric regression analysis. Consistent with the theory,
there is a U-shaped relation between the state of demand and the propensity of firms to merge
horizontally, controlling for firms’ non-strategic incentives to merge. Furthermore, as predicted by
the model, this relation is driven by horizontal mergers within relatively concentrated industries,
whereas no such relation exists in industries in which strategic considerations are likely to be less
important.
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JEL Classification Numbers: G34.
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1 Introduction
There is a long-standing and ongoing debate regarding firms’ motives for engaging in mergers and
acquisitions. Neoclassical theories portray aggregate merger activity as firms’ value-enhancing response
to industry-wide and/or economy-wide shocks.1 Behavioral and agency theories, on the other hand,
view M&A’s as resulting from investors’ and/or managers’ cognitive biases, or the inherent conflicts
of interests between managers and investors.2 Some important empirical aspects of the aggregate
merger activity are widely accepted: mergers occur in waves; within each wave, they tend to cluster
by industry; and, within industries, higher merger activity is associated with larger positive or negative
shocks (e.g., Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Andrade and Staﬀord (2004), Harford (2005), and Gugler,
Mueller and Yurtoglu (2006)). However, why these patterns emerge remains an open question.
Most existing theories of merger timing abstract from competition in product markets. In this
paper, we explore the eﬀects of product market competition and industry structure on firms’ incentives
to engage in horizontal mergers and on the resulting dynamics of mergers. Ceteris paribus, a horizontal
merger increases the combined value of the merging firms, due to the post-merger collusion in output
markets. However, the reduced level of competition following a merger also attracts new firms to
enter the industry. Potential entry, in turn, reduces the value of the incumbents and their incentives
to merge. When an industry is in expansion, the value of the entry option is high regardless of the
industry structure, and the incumbents cannot deter entry by not merging. When an industry is
in decline, entry is unprofitable regardless of the incumbents’ decision whether to merge. Thus, in
the extreme states of demand, the incumbents’ merger decision has limited impact on the entrant’s
decision, and the eﬀect of higher incumbents’ profits due to post-merger collusion dominates the merger
decision. In intermediate states, the merger decision has a more pronounced eﬀect on the likelihood
of potential entry, and the incumbents may be better oﬀ not merging in order to delay entry. The
logic above suggests that as a result of the interaction between incumbents’ decision to merge and new
firms’ decision to enter an industry, horizontal mergers should occur with greater frequency during
periods of extreme growth or decline in demand in relatively concentrated industries.
There exists a substantial body of empirical evidence consistent with the two main driving forces in
1The list of potential benefits of merging includes, but is not limited to, eﬃciency-related gains (e.g., Jovanovic and
Rousseau (2002), Erard and Schaller (2002), and Lambrecht (2004)), disciplining target management (e.g., Jensen and
Ruback (1987) and Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1989)), responding to economic shocks (e.g., Gort (1969) and Mitchell
and Mulherin (1996)), and pursuit of market power (e.g., Stigler (1950), Perry and Porter (1985) and Deneckere and
Davidson (1985)).
2Recent studies by Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), and Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson,
and Viswanathan (2006) illustrate the link between takeover activity and stock market misvaluation. Roll’s (1986)
“hubris” hypothesis ascribes mergers to managers’ overconfidence. Jensen (1986) and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990)
suggest insiders’ self-interested behavior may be the driver of some mergers.
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our model: mergers increase incumbent firms’ market power and they may facilitate entry by outsiders.
For example, Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey (1997) and Prager and Hannan (1998) document that
mergers between banks lead to increased market power and lower deposit interest rates. Borenstein
(1990), Kim and Singal (1993), and Singal (1996) report similar evidence for the airline industry. A
clinical study of acquisitions in the microfilm industry by Barton and Sherman (1984) provides evidence
of significant post-merger price increases. Furthermore, the eﬀect of mergers on the incentives of new
firms to enter an industry is not only a clear result of an oligopolistic competition model, but also a
matter of explicit consideration by Antitrust authorities during merger application reviews.3 Berger,
Bonime, Goldberg, and White (2004) and Seelig and Critchfield (2003) find that mergers induce entry
in the banking industry. Therefore, it seems reasonable that strategic considerations may aﬀect firms’
incentives to merge and the resulting dynamics of horizontal mergers.
One implication of the existing models of merger timing is that firms’ incentives to merge in
periods of economic recession are diﬀerent from those in periods of expansion. Lambrecht (2004)
examines mergers motivated by operating synergies. In his model, mergers are likely to occur in
expansions. In Lambrecht and Myers (2007), takeovers serve as a mechanism to force disinvestment
in declining industries. Their arguments lead to takeover transactions occurring mostly in industries
that have experienced negative economic shocks. Similarly, in Mason and Weeds (2006) mergers
in expansions are motivated by production synergies, while those in recessions allow consolidation
and disinvestment.4 We show that in oligopolistic industries, strategic considerations increase the
likelihood of observing horizontal mergers both in periods of rising and declining demand and that
strategic incentives to attempt or delay horizontal mergers are more important in more concentrated
industries.
To highlight the impact of strategic considerations on the relation between the state of industry
demand and takeover activity, in the base model we purposely focus on the strategic aspects and
abstract from other important motives for merging. Strategic considerations, however, are but one of
several factors that may aﬀect firms’ decision to merge. In particular, we do recognize that assuming
no production synergies, no merger costs, no operating leverage, and duopolistic competition may
generate overly stylized results. Therefore, we also discuss the intuition behind a number of extensions
of the base model that relax these assumptions. These extensions show that strategic considerations
carry greater weight in firms’ merger decisions when the costs of merging, operating synergies, and
operating leverage are relatively low, and when the degree of industry concentration is relatively high.
3See, for example, the Merger Guidelines of 1997: “A merger having anticompetitive eﬀects can attract committed
entry that would not have occurred premerger.”
4See also Gorton, Kahl and Rosen (2009), who show that technological or regulatory shocks that increase the prof-
itability of future acquisitions can induce a wave of defensive mergers, and Gowrisankaran (1999) for a computational
approach to the analysis of mergers, investment, exit, and entry.
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Our theory is closely related to recent models incorporating product market competition into the
analysis of merger dynamics (e.g., Lambrecht (2004), Hackbarth and Miao (2007), and Yan (2006)).
Our contribution to this literature is showing that the threat of potential entry is a crucial determinant
of the dynamics of mergers, whereas entry is not allowed in existing models. Our model is also related
to studies that examine entry into an industry within a dynamic setting (e.g., Dixit (1989), Baldursson
(1998), Grenadier (2002), Fries, Miller and Perraudin (1997), Lambrecht (2001), and Zhdanov (2007)).
We contribute to the dynamic entry literature by incorporating the possibility of a merger initiated
by incumbent firms. In addition, our analysis is related to studies that examine the link between
incumbents’ incentives to merge and outsiders’ incentives to enter the industry (e.g., Cabral (2003),
Marino and Zábojník (2006), Toxvaerd (2008), and Werden and Froeb (1998)). We contribute to this
literature by examining the timing of mergers in the presence of potential entry in rising and declining
industries.
The problem we analyze is by its very nature dynamic, because a key driver of the relation between
demand shocks and mergers in the model is the eﬀect that mergers have on the timing of future entry.
We rely on a continuous-time real options framework to characterize the dynamics of both mergers
and entry, because this approach results in time-independent equilibria and, thus, is more analytically
tractable than a finite-period dynamic game. In addition, employing a framework similar to that of
other recent models of merger timing (e.g., Lambrecht (2004), Lambrecht and Myers (2007), Hackbarth
and Morellec (2007), Morellec and Zhdanov (2005, 2008), Leland (2007), and Hackbarth and Miao
(2007) among others) allows us to disentangle the eﬀects of product market interaction on the timing
of mergers from other, non-product-market-related eﬀects.
We contribute to the empirical merger literature by showing, using parametric and semi-parametric
tests, that an important reason for the U-shaped relation between economic shocks and merger inten-
sity, documented in Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Andrade and Staﬀord (2004), and Harford (2005),
is the eﬀect of demand shocks on firms’ incentives to merge horizontally. Furthermore, the evidence
shows that the U-shaped relation between horizontal merger intensity and the state of industry de-
mand is present in relatively concentrated industries, whereas it is absent in relatively competitive
ones, in which strategic considerations are likely to play a lesser role. This evidence is consistent with
our model, which predicts that, ceteris paribus, horizontal mergers within oligopolistic industries are
more likely to occur in times of high and low demand relative to times of intermediate demand, and
that such pattern disappears within relatively competitive industries.
The next section presents the model illustrating the strategic motives for merging and discusses
the model’s empirical implications. In Section 3 we present empirical tests of some of the model’s
predictions. Section 4 summarizes our theoretical and empirical results and concludes. All proofs are
provided in Appendix 1. Appendix 2 contains definitions of variables used in the empirical analysis.
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2 The model
2.1 Setup
Assumption 1
There are two incumbents in the industry. Each incumbent is endowed with capital, . Moreover,
entry by one firm is allowed, with an equal amount of capital, . The firms’ production functions are
of the Cobb-Douglas specification with two factors and constant returns to scale:
 =  12
1
2  (1)
where  is firm ’s output, and  is the amount of labor it employs.5
The cost of one unit of labor per unit of time is denoted . The amount of capital is fixed,
hence labor is the only variable input. At any given instant, each firm can costlessly adjust its labor
input to produce any output quantity. Since firms are not able to alter the level of capital, firm ’s
instantaneous variable cost of producing  units is
() = 
2
 (2)
Note that this specification assumes away technological (production) synergies.6
Assumption 2
The firms are subject to heterogenous-products Bertrand competition.
The heterogenous-products Bertrand competition allows us to accommodate diﬀerent degrees of
substitutability among the rivals’ products and analyze comparative statics with respect to the extent
of competition. The logic and results of the model, however, are robust to choosing diﬀerent types of
product market competition.7
Assumption 3
The demand-side of the industry is characterized by a representative consumer with quadratic instan-
taneous utility function
(−→ ) = √
X
=1
 − 1
2
⎡
⎣
X
=1
2 + 2
X
 6=

⎤
⎦  (3)
5Thus, the quantity produced during a time interval  is 
6Cobb-Douglas specification is a convenient way to separate strategic reasons for merging from technologic (synergistic)
reasons. Because the utility and production functions are symmetric, the incumbents’ equilibrium production quantities
are equal, 1 = 2 = . Moreover, because the incumbents employ the same level of capital, the cost of producing 1
and 2 separately, 21  + 
2
2  = 2
2
 , is the same as the cost of producing the same quantities while joining capital:
(1+2)2
2  = 2
2
 .
7For, example, it is easy to show that the qualitative results and empirical predictions remain unaﬀected under the
assumption of Cournot competition with homogenous products. The proof is available upon request.
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where , , and  are the parameters of the utility function,  is (annualized) consumption of good
,  is the number of active firms in the industry and, thus, the number of available products, and  is
the stochastic shock to the representative consumer’s utility. This specification of the utility function
is typical of partial equilibrium models commonly used in the industrial organization literature (see,
for example, Vives (2000)).8 We further assume that  follows a geometric Brownian motion
 = + 
where  is a standard Wiener process on a filtered probability space (Ω   ).
We impose the standard conditions:   0 and     0 (see Vives (2000)).   0 implies that
the goods produced are substitutes, which is reasonable for products of firms competing in the same
industry.   0 and    imply that the utility function is concave in each of its arguments. The
specific functional form of the relation between the representative agent’s utility and the state of the
stochastic shock, , is made for analytical convenience. It is common in the industrial organization
literature to assume that shocks to demand correspond to changes in the intercept of the demand
function. Consistent with this norm, as shown below, the term
√ in the linear term of the utility
function translates into a linear relation between
√ and the intercept of the demand function. This,
in turn, translates into a linear relation between  and firms’ instantaneous profits.
Equating the marginal utility that the representative consumer derives from consuming product
 to its price and solving the resulting system of  equations in  unknowns (quantities) defines the
demand function for product  as a function of ’s own price and the other products’ prices:
(−→ ) = √−  + 
X
 6=
  (4)
where
 =  + (− 1) 
 =  + (− 2)
[ + (− 1)]( − ) 
 = 
[ + (− 1)]( − )  (5)
As mentioned above, the only benefit of merging in the base-case model is that the incumbents can
coordinate their pricing strategies. The entrant benefits from the merger, due to the lower level of
competition. This leads to the following intuitive results.
8This specification implicitly assumes that there is a numeraire good (or money), which represents the rest of the
economy, and income is large enough, so that the budget constraint is never binding and all income eﬀects are captured
by the consumption of the numeraire good. Note also that since the income constraint never binds, the cosnumer’s
optimization problem is completely time-separable, so in any time interval  the consumer maximizes her instanteneous
utility (−→ )
5
Lemma 1 (i) The combined instantaneous profit of the two incumbents is higher if they merge than
if they stay separate, ceteris paribus.
(ii) The entrant’s instantaneous profit is higher if the two incumbents merge than if they stay separate,
ceteris paribus.
(iii) The incumbents’ combined instantaneous profit is higher in the case of no merger and no entry
than in the case of a merger and entry.
When the two incumbents merge, they charge higher prices because they internalize the cannibal-
ization eﬀect of raising one product’s price on the quantity sold of the other product. This benefits
the entrant and increases its instantaneous profit.9 Combining the first and third parts of Lemma 1
results in the following set of relations for the combined instantaneous profits of the incumbents in the
four possible scenarios (merger/ no merger combined with entry/ no entry):
(no entry, merger)  (no entry, no merger)  (entry, merger)  (entry, no merger)
(6)
This result is important. The first and third inequalities show that given the presence/absence
of the entrant in the industry, the incumbents are always better oﬀ merging (part (i) of Lemma 1).
The second inequality (part (iii) of Lemma 1) is at the heart of our analysis and implies that the
incumbents may be better oﬀ not merging, if by staying separate they can deter potential entry of the
new firm in the industry.
Absent the threat of new entry, the optimal strategy of the incumbents is to initiate a merger
attempt independent of the state of the industry demand, because it is costless to do so. The threat of
potential entry makes the problem more realistic and interesting, by introducing an opportunity cost
the incumbents must bear when attempting a merger. On the other hand, the entrant’s profit and,
thus, its decision to enter depends on whether the incumbents have merged.
Assumption 4
Incumbent firms are endowed with an option to initiate one attempt to merge with each other (combine
operations).10 Attempting and implementing merger among incumbents entails no out-of-pocket costs.
9The focus of the Merger Guidelines on the fact that mergers may induce entry suggests that business combinations
may benefit potential entrants. This is also consistent with the empirical evidence discussed in the introduction.
10We do not allow for entry combined with acquisition of one of the incumbents, as in McCardle and Viswanathan
(1994). The reason is that in our setting, entry by means of a merger with one of the incumbents is suboptimal. An
incumbent facing a proposal to merge with a potential entrant is better oﬀ initiating a merger attempt with another
incumbent instead, with a goal of potentially deterring immediate entry. A merger between incumbents followed by entry
generates profits identical to the case in which an entrant merges with one of the incumbents. However, as shown below,
incumbents may want to postpone a merger among themselves in order to deter immediate entry. (The incumbents would
only consider a merger with an entrant if they have already initiated an unsuccessful merger attempt among themselves,
however an analysis of multiple merger attempts among various players is beyond the scope of our paper.)
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Once initiated, the merger attempt is successful with probability   1.
The assumption that a merger attempt does no necessarily result in a successful merger is consis-
tent with the empirical evidence. First, a merger attempt can be unsuccessful due to diﬃculties in
the negotiation process. Anti-takeover provisions, such as staggered boards, limits to shareholder by-
law amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, supermajority requirements, and state anti-takover
legislation reduce the likelihood of successful merger attempts (e.g., Comment and Schwert (1995),
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2008)). Boone and Mulherin (2007) report that only 27% of potential
bidders that sign a confidentiality agreement and only 78% of bidders that submit a private written
oﬀer succeed in acquiring their target. Second, even when the firms involved are willing parties to the
negotiation, antitrust authorities may oppose the transaction on anticompetitive grounds or provide
conditional approval, requiring firms to divest the operations that pose the highest anti-competitive
threat. This, of course, is an aspect that is particularly relevant in the context of our model. In
Eckbo’s (1983) sample of 191 horizontal mergers that occurred between 1963 and 1978, for instance,
65 were challenged by either the Justice Department or the Federal Trade Commission.
Finally, even if the merger deal is successfully completed, there remains uncertainty about the abil-
ity of the merging firms to successfully integrate their operations. Mitchell and Lehn (1990) and Lehn
and Zhao (2006) show that there are badly conceived mergers that are subsequently thwarted through
divestitures, bust-up takeovers, and management turnover.11 There is also anecdotal evidence that
suggests that post-merger successful integration is far from being certain. For instance, AOL/Time
Warner faced a class-action complaint that “...the merger between America Online and Time Warner
was not being eﬀectively integrated and the Company lacked an eﬀective plan to integrate the two
companies.”12
The assumption that the two incumbents are endowed with only one option to initiate a merger
attempt is made for analytical tractability. From the modelling perspective, allowing multiple merger
attempts is equivalent to raising the probability of merger success, . In the base model, because
we assume merging entails no out-of-pocket costs, allowing a finite number of merger attempts would
result in a series of attempts that would stop either after a successful merger or after all attempts have
been exhausted. Uncertainty about the success of the merger attempt is crucial in our model. This is
because absent uncertainty, entry is independent of the merger attempt and vice versa, which makes
mergers optimal in all states of world.
Assumption 5
Upon successful consummation of the merger, the shareholders of each incumbent receive a 50% stake
in the merged entity.
11See also Mueller (1993) for a discussion of mergers that destroy value.
12See Steven Schmalz v. AOL Time Warer Inc.
7
We abstract from the analysis of how merger gains are allocated. All that is required for a deal to
take place is that the combined value of the merging firms increases as a result of a merger. Because the
two incumbents are identical in all respects, we simply assume that the gains are split evenly between
the merging firms to ensure that the merger is desirable for both sets of shareholders. Moreover, in
our model the merger payment method (cash or stock) is irrelevant, as long as capital markets are
eﬃcient and securities are correctly priced. Therefore, we do not analyze misvaluation-driven merges,
as in Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) or in Shleifer and Vishny (2003).
Assumption 6
Entry requires the outsider to incur a fixed irreversible cost, , to obtain capital . This assumption
precludes immediate entry for low realizations of the demand shock.
Consistent with economic intuition, the 1997 Horizontal Mergers Guidelines highlight that costless
entry precludes mergers motivated by the pursuit of market power. Given that strategic (market—
power-related) considerations are the focus of our analysis, we assume entry is indeed costly.
Assumption 7
We normalize the amount of installed capital of each firm, , the cost of labor, , and the coeﬃcient
on the quadratic term of the utility function, , to one.
This assumption is made for analytical convenience only. Normalizing  to one is innocuous. In
addition, it is straightforward to show that the general version of the model with  and  that are
diﬀerent from one produces the same conclusions as the more restrictive model we are examining
here.13 Before proceeding to the formal solution of the model, it is worth discussing the structure of
the strategic game and providing the basic intuition for the results.
2.2 Basic intuition
The model involves two optimization problems that must be solved simultaneously. On the one hand,
the potential entrant trades oﬀ the present value of expected profits upon entry, which depends on the
outcome of the incumbents’ merger decision, against the cost of entry, . In particular, by altering the
industry’s competitive structure, a successful merger increases the value of entry. On the other hand,
the incumbent firms decide whether to attempt a merger by trading oﬀ the benefits of greater market
power against the cost of making entry into the industry more attractive for the potential entrant.
The optimal merger and entry decisions depend on the value of the stochastic demand shock,  If
 is high enough (i.e. the industry is in expansion), entry into the industry is attractive regardless of
whether the incumbents have merged. Therefore, the strategic cost of merging disappears because the
incumbents cannot deter entry by not merging, and attempting to merge becomes optimal. If  is low
13This extension of the model is available upon request.
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enough (i.e. the industry is in recession), entry is unlikely to occur for some time until the state of the
demand improves, even if the incumbents successfully merge. Therefore, the strategic cost of merging
is not large enough to oﬀset the gains from coordination of incumbents’ product market strategies,14
and attempting to merge becomes optimal. Finally, if  is neither too high nor too low, the strategic
cost of merging resulting from the increased likelihood of entry into the industry following a merger
may become large enough to prompt the incumbents to postpone their merger attempt.
Let us first discuss the optimization problem of the entrant. Time does not enter the optimization
problem explicitly, and the optimal entry decision takes the form of an upper threshold, such that it
is optimal to enter at the first passage time of the stochastic shock  to the threshold. There are three
possible states of the industry, leading to three optimal entry thresholds:
1) the incumbents have not yet exercised their merger option (but they can do it in the future);
2) the incumbents have initiated a merger attempt, but it did not succeed (and no future attempts
are possible);
3) the incumbents have successfully merged.
We denote the three entry thresholds as 1)  (an upper threshold; this notation will become clear
below), 2)  (entry, no merger is feasible), and 3)  (entry at a time when the incumbents
have already merged), respectively. Once the incumbents have exercised the option to attempt a
merger (2 and 3 above), the entry decision depends on the the state of the industry demand and
the known outcome of the merger. As shown in part (ii) of Lemma 1, the entrant is better oﬀ if
the incumbents have successfully merged than if the merger attempt was unsuccessful. This implies
that the outsider would enter at a lower state of the stochastic shock if the merger attempt has been
successful:   . In other words, a successful merger attempt speeds up new entry. When
the merger option is alive, the optimal entry threshold, , is the solution to the joint optimization
program of the incumbents and the new entrant. Because the merger may be unsuccessful when
attempted, entry in this case is less attractive than in the case in which the incumbents have successfully
merged. Therefore, optimal entry requires higher instantaneous profits (higher industry demand) and
the following must hold:    Similarly, because the merger may be successful when attempted,
entry is more attractive in case 1) than in case 2), which implies that   .
Let us now discuss the incumbents’ problem. Given the entry thresholds, it is not optimal for
the incumbents to attempt a merger when     , because a completed merger lowers their
14We do not allow stand-alone incumbent firms to engage in collusion and do not consider any crime-and-punishment
strategies. Similar to the majority of dynamic models (e.g., Doraszelski and Pakes (2006), Hackbarth and Miao (2007),
and Spiegel and Tookes (2007)), we focus on Markov strategies. Introducing the possibility of collusion would make the
option to merge worthless in the base version of the model. Thus, the two firms engage in an irreversible merger in order
to be able to coordinate their pricing. Given the extensive empirical evidence, discussed above, indicating that mergers
lead to higher output prices, this seems a reasonable assumption.
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value by prompting immediate entry, while an unsuccessful attempt does not aﬀect immediate entry
decision. A successful merger attempt, however, becomes more attractive as the state of the industry
deteriorates,   , because it increases incumbents’ market power without prompting immediate
entry. For values of  slightly below  a successful merger would not result in immediate entry
but would increase its probability in the near future. As  further decreases, this probability declines.
When  is suﬃciently lower than  the expected loss in the value of the incumbents due to an
earlier future entry is fully oﬀset by the increase in their value due to immediate higher instantaneous
post-merger profits. At a certain critical lower threshold, , the incumbents become exactly indiﬀerent
between attempting a merger or staying separate. For the values of  below  it is always optimal
to make a merger attempt.
For  ≤    the entrant’s decision depends on whether the incumbents have attempted a
merger, and the incumbents decision whether to merge depends on whether the outsider has entered
the industry. We show below that for  ≤   , a subgame-perfect equilibrium exists in mixed
strategies, in which the incumbents and the potential entrant merge/enter with certain probabilities,
which are functions of the demand shock,  Intuitively,  is the lowest value of  at which the entrant
might find it optimal to enter unilaterally if it anticipates that incumbents are not going to attempt
a merger prior to entry. Similarly,  is the highest value of  for which the entrant’s decision
depends on incumbents’ merger decision. For  ≥ , the outsider enters unilaterally regardless of
whether the incumbents have attempted a merger. To summarize, a merger attempt is optimal when
 =  or for  ≤   , while delaying the merger is optimal for     15
In what follows we prove that this intuitively appealing sequence of events is a subgame-perfect
equilibrium of the entry-merger game.
15 It is conceivable that in reality an entrant’s capital could be diﬀerent from that of the incumbents. Denoting the
entrant’s capital level by , the entrant’s cost of producing  units of output is () = 2 . Solving the model with
 6= 1 we obtain the (lower) threshold level of entrant’s capital, ∗ , below which the condition  −  0 ceases
to be satisfied. For low levels of , the entrant’s equilibrium output is too low to oﬀset the increased-market-power
eﬀect of merger. Clearly, as  → 0, entry does not aﬀect incumbents’ instantaneous profits, leading them to attempt a
merger immediately. Notably, the threshold level of  below which strategic incentives to postpone a merger disappear
is low: depending on the degree of competitive interaction, , the threshold entrant’s capital varies between 0 and 75%
of the incumbents’ capital. The detailed solution of this case is available upon request. It can also be demonstrated
numerically that if the entrant is allowed to choose its capital level at the time of entry (in addition to choosing the
timing of entry) and if the cost of entry  is proportional to the level of capital with which the outsider enters, then for
various combinations of parameter values, entry with low levels of capital is suboptimal, and the entrant would optimally
choose to enter with capital large enough to lead to two distinct merger thresholds, as in the model.
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2.3 Analysis
We now proceed to the formal analysis of the model. In what follows, we incorporate the derivations
of the firms’ instantaneous profits under diﬀerent industry structures, found in the proofs of Lemma 1
in the Appendix, and introduce the following simplifying notation for the firms’ instantaneous profits
under diﬀerent scenarios:
 = 12(no entry, no merger) =
2 ¡2− 2¢
(4 +  − 2)2  (7)
 = 12(no entry, merger) =
2
4(2 + )  (8)
 = 12(entry, merger) =
2(4 + 3 − 32)2(2 +  − 22)
4(1 + )2(8 + 4 − 92 + 23)2  (9)
 = 12(entry, no merger) =
2(1 + )(1 +  − 2)
2(2 + 3)2  (10)
 = 1(no merger) =
2(1 + )(1 +  − 2)
2(2 + 3)2  (11)
 = 1(merger) =
22(2− 2)2(1 +  − 2)
(1 + )(8 + 4 − 92 + 23)2  (12)
We start by establishing the optimal thresholds  and  corresponding to the cases in which
the incumbents have already attempted a merger, either successfully or not.
Lemma 2 If the incumbents have already exercised their option to attempt a merger and have not
succeeded, then the optimal entry threshold is given by
 = 11 − 1
( − )
  (13)
where 1 is the positive root of the quadratic equation 122( − 1) +  −  = 0
1 = 12 −

2 +
sµ
1
2
− 2
¶2
+
2
2  (14)
If the incumbents have successfully merged, then the optimal entry threshold is
 = 11 − 1
( − )
  (15)
As argued above, in order to find  and  we need to examine the incumbents’ and entrant’s
optimization programs simultaneously. The following two results provide a set of equations that
determine the solution to the entrant’s and incumbents’ optimization problems.
Lemma 3 If      then the entrant’s value is given by
  () = 1 +2  (16)
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where  and  are constants to be determined below, and 2 is the negative root of the quadratic
equation 122( − 1) +  −  = 0
2 = 12 −

2 −
s∙
1
2
− 2
¸2
+
2
2  (17)
The following conditions must hold at  and  :
1 +2 = 1 −  [
 + (1− )]−  (18)
11−1 +22−1 = 1 −  [
 + (1− ) ] (19)
and
1 +2 = 
µ 

¶1 µ
 −  − 
¶
+ (1− )
µ 

¶1 µ
 −  − 
¶
 (20)
Equations (18) and (20) are the value-matching conditions, which stipulate that the values of
the entrant at the two merger thresholds are exactly equal to their respective expected post-merger-
attempt values. (These values are the weighted averages of the values conditional on a successful
and unsuccessful merger attempts.) Equation (19) is the smooth-pasting condition that ensures the
optimality of the outsider’s entry decision.
Lemma 3 provides us with three equations in four unknowns (two constants,  and  and the
optimal merging thresholds,  and ) Thus, we need additional conditions in order to solve for the
optimal merging thresholds. The remaining conditions come from the optimization program of the
incumbents. These conditions are derived as follows.
Lemma 4 If      then the value of each incumbent is given by
() = 1 +2 + 

 
 −   (21)
where  and  are constants to be determined together with , , , and . The following conditions
must hold at the upper and lower merging thresholds,  and :
1 +2 + 

 
 −  =
1
 − 
(
  + (1− )
"
  +
µ 

¶1
( −  )
#)
 (22)
1 +2 +
 
 −  =
1
 − {
"µ 

¶1
( −  ) +  
#
+
+ (1− )
"µ 

¶1
( −  ) +  
#
} (23)
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11−1 + 22−1 +

 −  =
1
 − {
"11−1
()1 (

 −  ) + 
#
+
+ (1− )
" 11−1
()1 (

 −  ) + 
#
} (24)
In (21) the term 

 − refers to the present value of each incumbent’s perpetual entitlement to
instantaneous profits if the incumbents never merge and the outsider never enters. The remaining
terms, 1 +2  account for the change in each incumbent’s value due to the incumbents’ option
to merge among themselves and for the threat of new entry.
Equations (22) and (23) are the value-matching conditions for each incumbent’s optimization
problem, while (24) is the smooth-pasting condition that must obtain at the lower merging threshold.
The first term on the right-hand side in (22) is the post-merger value of an incumbent if the merger
attempt is successful, and the second term is the value of the incumbent in case of an unsuccessful
merger attempt. Note that the expression on the right hand side of (22) (unlike that of (18)) accounts
for the fact that the merger attempt would actually precede entry, so the new entrant is able to
postpone entry if the merger attempt is unsuccessful. On the contrary, (18) does not have the same
term on the right hand side because the upper merger threshold is determined as the one that makes
entry optimal even if the potential entrant cannot anticipate the result of the merger attempt. The
next proposition establishes the equilibrium of the model.
Proposition 1
1) The merger-entry game does not have a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which each subgame has
a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. There exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium involving mixed
strategies.
2) In the subgame-perfect equilibrium, the incumbents’ strategy is to attempt a merger at , and to
attempt a merger with a probability () at each  ∈ [ ) if the entrant has not entered prior
to reaching . If the outsider enters at  ∈ [ ) the incumbents’ strategy is to attempt a merger
immediately after entry. The entrant’s strategy is to enter at  if the incumbents’ merger attempt
at  succeeded, enter immediately after a successful merger attempt at  ∈ [ ), enter with
probability () at each  ∈ [ ) if the incumbents have not merged prior to reaching , and
enter at  if the merger attempt failed or if merger has not been attempted prior to . The
probabilities () and () are derived in Appendix 1.
The intuition for the lack of a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which each subgame involves pure
strategies is as follows. Let us assume that the incumbents attempting a merger at any fixed  ∈
[ ) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium. If  ≤ , then the entrant’s optimal strategy is
to enter immediately if the merger attempt has been successful and to enter at  if it has been
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unsuccessful. Then, it follows from part (iii) of Lemma 1 that it is not optimal for the incumbents to
merge at  ≤ . Assume now that the incumbents’ strategy is to merge at  ∈ ( ). Then,
the optimal response of the outsider is to enter at  + , if the merger attempt is successful, or at
, if it is unsuccessful. Given the entrant’s best response, the incumbents’ strategy is not optimal
because their best response is instead to merge at , not . Therefore, there are no subgame-perfect
equilibria in pure strategies in which the incumbents attempt to merge at any  ∈ [ ).
In the subgame-perfect equilibrium in Proposition 1, the incumbents and entrant choose their
respective merger/entry probabilities at each  ∈ [ ) in such a way that they are indiﬀerent
between acting unilaterally (attempting a merger/entering) or waiting. In other words, for any  ∈ [
), there exists a mixed strategies subgame-perfect equilibrium in which the incumbents attempt
to merge with a certain probability before observing the entrant’s move and, likewise, the outsider
enters with a certain probability before observing the incumbents’ move. The likelihood of observing
an entry and/or merger attempt is increasing in  in the range [ ). For  → , to make
the outsider indiﬀerent between entering unilaterally and waiting, the probability of unilateral merger
attempt has to approach zero. For  → , to make an entrant indiﬀerent between entering and
waiting, the probability density of a merger attempt has to be very high. Similar logic holds for the
incumbents’ probability of attempting a merger.16 To summarize, in the upper merger range two
diﬀerent sequences of events can occur: 1) a successful merger attempt is followed by immediate entry,
while an unsuccessful attempt is followed by delayed entry; 2) entry is followed by an immediate
merger attempt.
2.4 Results, interpretation, and empirical predictions
In this section we derive numerical solutions for the thresholds  and , and discuss their comparative
statics with respect to the model’s parameters.17 Figure 1 shows how the optimal merging thresholds
vary with the volatility of the demand process, , and its expected growth rate,  Figure 2 illustrates
the merging thresholds as functions of the entry cost, . To compute the numerical solutions in Figures
1 and 2, we assume:  = 1,  = 001 (except in Figure 1a),  = 005,  = 02 (except in Figure 1b),
 = 5 (except in Figure 2),  = 05, and  = 07. The comparative statics depicted in Figures 1 - 2
are insensitive to the choice of parameter values.
Insert Figures 1 and 2 here
As shown in Figure 1a, there is a positive relation between the merger thresholds,  and , and the
16See a detailed discussion of the probability densities of unilateral entry and merger attempt in the Appendix.
17Proposition 1 showed that merger could happen either when  =  or when  ≤   . In what follows,
in order to simplify the discussion, we concentrate on the lower end of this range, . It follows from (14) that the
comparative statics of  with respect to the model’s parameters have the same shape as those of .
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volatility of the industry demand, . This result is driven by the potential entrant’ optimal decision.
Higher volatility increases the value of the outsider’s option to wait — i.e., reduces its incentives to
enter the industry. Hence, higher volatility leads to higher entry thresholds, in particular the one
corresponding to the case in which merger has not been attempted yet, . Moreover, due to the
lower threat of future entry at each   , higher volatility reduces the strategic cost of merging.
Because in this region higher volatility reduces the expected cost while leaving the expected benefit of
merging unaﬀected, it also increases the optimal lower merging threshold, . A reverse logic applies
to the demand growth rate, . In particular, higher expected growth accelerates optimal entry (i.e.,
reduces the optimal entry thresholds) and, therefore, reduces the optimal merger thresholds. Similar
intuition applies to the merger thresholds in Figure 2. Higher entry costs deter potential entry and,
thus, raise the optimal merger thresholds.
The most important observation from Figures 1 and 2 is that for various combinations of parameter
values there is a substantial wedge between the lower merging threshold  and the lower edge of the
upper merging range, . Thus, there is a region in which the incumbents choose to postpone their
merger in order not to induce entry into the industry. In other words, firms merge horizontally either
when the industry demand shock is high enough (i.e. the state of demand enters the upper merger
range) or when it is low enough (i.e. the state of demand passes the lower merger threshold from
above). This discussion leads to the first empirical prediction of the model.18
Prediction 1. Horizontal mergers are more likely in industries subject to extremely high and low
demand shocks. In other words, the relation between horizontal merger intensity and demand shocks
is expected to be U-shaped.
Note that this prediction is diﬀerent from the implication of various production (technology)-driven
models of merger timing, such as Lambrecht (2004), Lambrecht and Myers (2007), and Mason and
Weeds (2006), which jointly predict that restructuring driven by the desire to exploit technological
synergies is likely to occur in expansions, while mergers motivated by the desire to dispose of excess
capacity are likely to occur in downturns. The important diﬀerence is that our model, based on
purely strategic, product-market-driven considerations, implies a U-shaped relation between the state
of demand and merger intensity in the industry for horizontal mergers only, while being silent on this
relation for conglomerate or vertical mergers. Thus, in order to distinguish our model from existing
production-driven models, in the empirical part of the paper, we examine whether the relation between
18The results of the model provide comparative statics of merging thresholds with respect to the model’s parameters.
Merging thresholds, however, are unobservable. Therefore, we articulate the empirical predictions in terms of the relations
between merger intensity in various states of demand and proxies for the model’s parameters. It is easy to illustrate
the intuitive transition from merger thresholds to merger intensity by examining the relation between the probability of
observing a merger within a certain time frame and the initial value of demand process, 0. This illustration is available
upon request.
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industry demand shocks and horizontal merger intensity diﬀers from the relation between demand
shocks and non-horizontal merger activity.
Figure 3 examines the relation between merger thresholds and product substitutability, , and
shows that the merging thresholds increase with .
Insert Figure 3 here
Higher substitutability implies tougher competition and, thus, lower expected value of entry and higher
benefit of merging to coordinate incumbents’ product market strategies and exploit increased market
power. Therefore, because the strategic cost of merging is lower, the lower edge of the upper merging
range and, consequently, the lower merging threshold increase with . Importantly, Figure 3 shows
that the distance between  and  is increasing in , consistent with the notion that a U-shaped
relation between demand shocks and merger intensity is more likely in industries with higher degree
of competitive interaction (product substitutability). Indeed, the eﬀect of merger between incumbents
on potential entrant and the eﬀect of entry on the incumbents are the highest when products are
perfect substitutes and these eﬀects are absent when demand for a firm’s product is unrelated to
prices charged by the firm’s competitors. This leads to the second empirical prediction.
Prediction 2. A U-shaped relation between horizontal merger intensity and the state of demand is
more likely the more similar (substitutable) are the industry participants’ products or, in other words,
the higher the degree of competitive interaction in the industry.19
The base model presented above shows that strategic considerations alone could lead to mergers
occurring in periods of high and low states of the stochastic shock, while no mergers happen in inter-
mediate states. In the next subsection we analyze how the model’s restrictive assumptions influence
the dynamics of mergers described above. To that end, we extend the model in three directions. First,
we assume that mergers are costly. This extension is motivated by Lambrecht (2004), in whose model
fixed merger costs coupled with pro-cyclical merger benefits lead to mergers only in relatively good
states of the economy. We examine whether and to what extent the assumption of costless mergers
in our base model is responsible for our main result, that mergers occur both during periods of ris-
ing demand and periods of declining demand. Second, we incorporate synergies into our analysis to
assess the relevance of strategic considerations when mergers produce other non-strategic benefits. In
particular, we discuss the eﬀects that increasing returns to scale, producing merger-related variable
cost savings, and operating leverage, producing merger-related fixed cost savings, have on equilibrium
19To gauge the degree of competitive interaction within an industry, one may use the “Competitive Strategy Measure,”
proposed by Sundaram, John and John (1996), which estimates the responsiveness of a firm’s profit to changes in its
product market rivals’ strategies, and is based on the correlation between the period-to-period change in firm’s rivals’
combined sales and the ratio of the change in the firm’s profit and the change in its sales.
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strategies. Finally, we analyze the eﬀects of industry structure on the model’s results. To that end,
we depart from the duopolistic setting adopted in the base model and examine an oligopoly with an
arbitrary number of incumbent firms, two of which are allowed to merge. In what follows, we briefly
outline the extensions of the model and resulting additional empirical predictions.
2.5 Extensions and additional predictions
2.5.1 Costly mergers
In reality, executing a merger may involve costs.20 Thus, we follow Lambrecht (2004) and assume that
a successful merger attempt requires the incumbents to bear a fixed cost.21 The next lemma outlines
equilibrium merger strategies that obtain for various levels of takeover costs.
Lemma 5 (i) If the cost of merging, , is suﬃciently low, then the incumbents’ optimal strategy
remains qualitatively similar to the merging strategy derived in the base model, in the sense that there
is a lower merging threshold  and an upper merging range [ ).
(ii) For higher values of , the strategic incentive to merge at the low threshold no longer outweighs
the merger cost. In this case there is no lower merger threshold, and a merger attempt will only be
observed between  and .
(iii) For suﬃciently high merger costs, the optimal entry and merger strategies become independent.
The intuition for case (iii) in Lemma 5 is as follows. If the costs of merging are very high, a
merger is only profitable at levels of the industry demand that exceed the level required for the entry
to be optimal when no merger attempt has occurred. Thus, a merger attempt always occurs after
the outsider has entered. A formal analysis performed in Appendix 1 indicates, however, that merger
costs may have to be unreasonably high for such a situation to arise.
In order to find incumbents’ optimal merging strategy, for each value of the takeover cost, , we
compare the combined value of the incumbents conditional on following the restructuring strategy as in
case (i) above to their combined value corresponding to the merger strategy as in case (ii), and choose
the restructuring strategy that maximizes the incumbents’ value. The eﬀects of the takeover cost on
the merger thresholds are illustrated in Figure 4, which plots the optimal thresholds as functions of
the restructuring cost, .
Insert Figure 4 here
Consistent with the intuition above, there are two regimes corresponding to diﬀerent values of the
restructuring cost:
20Merger costs include but are not limited to legal and advisory transaction fees, as well the cost of consolidating the
operations after a merger is completed (e.g., severance payments in case of workforce reduction).
21The conclusions of the extended model remain intact if we assume that the merger cost, , is incurred at the time
of a merger attempt, regardless of whether it is successful.
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1) it is optimal to merge at the higher and the lower thresholds;
2) it is optimal to merge only at the higher threshold.
The switch from regime 1 to regime 2 occurs at  = 08 (corresponding to 16% of the cost of entry,
) for the base set of parameter values.22 Figure 4 illustrates the following empirical prediction.
Prediction 3. A U-shaped relation between horizontal merger intensity and the state of demand is
more likely in industries with relatively low restructuring costs.
2.5.2 Merger synergies
Whether merger-related operating synergies exist is the subject of an ongoing debate (e.g., Andrade,
Mitchell, and Staﬀord (2001), Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1990), Kaplan and Weisbach (1992),
McGuckin and Nguyen (1995), Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) among others). Yet, it is possible
that some M&A’s are driven by synergistic considerations. In order to model the synergistic eﬀect
of a merger we assume that the production function exhibits increasing returns to scale and has the
following specification:
 = 
1
2  (25)
where   12  ( = 12 , as in our base case, implies zero synergies.   12 leads to cost savings due to
economies of scale and results in a synergistic eﬀect whose magnitude increases with 23)
Potential operating synergies have two reinforcing eﬀects on the incumbents’ incentives to merge.
First, the availability of synergies increases incumbents’ post-merger profits, oﬀsetting the strategic
cost of merging to some degree and, thus, making a merger attempt more desirable. Second, if the
synergistic gains are in the form of cost savings, the merged entity produces more at lower prices in
equilibrium compared to the case of no synergies, which has an adverse eﬀect on the value of potential
entrant and, thus, reduces the strategic cost of merging. As a result of these two eﬀects, the incumbents’
incentives to delay the merger in order to deter entry are weaker. Figure 5 illustrates this intuition,
by plotting the equilibrium instantaneous profits of the incumbents and potential entrant as functions
of the synergy. The synergy value is computed as the percentage increase in the instantaneous profits
of the merged entity relative to the zero-synergy case:
() = 

 ()
 ( = 12)
− 1 (26)
Insert Figure 5 here
22The actual merger costs appear much lower than this number. For example, Hunter and Walker (1990) report an
average merger fee of 0.6% of the value of the deal. Therefore, our model implies that in many industries, especially in
more concentrated ones, we are likely to observe mergers at both the higher and the lower thresholds.
23 Indeed, if the two incumbents produced  units each using separate production, the combined production cost would
be 2
2
2 , while producing 2 units using combined capital would cost 2
2
2
2
22   2
2
2  as long as   12 
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The dashed line in Figure 5 shows the profit of the potential entrant facing two stand-alone incumbents,
while the solid line shows the entrant’s post-merger profit. Figure 5 implies that there exists a critical
level of synergies below which the main results of our base model continue to hold. In particular,
holding the model parameters at the base-case level and assuming there are increasing returns to scale
(i.e., merging produces cost savings), the incumbents have an incentive to deter entry by not merging
when the synergy value does not exceed 5.8% of the merged entity’s no-synergies instantaneous profits
( = 0617).24 For higher synergy values, the entrant is better oﬀ when the incumbents operate as
separate entities. Thus, for suﬃciently high synergistic gains, not only the strategic cost of merging
disappears, but it eventually becomes a strategic benefit, as a successful merger deters entry. In such
cases, the optimal strategy to attempt to merge immediately. Figure 6 summarizes this intuition,
by showing how the optimal merger thresholds vary with the value of synergies for the base set of
parameter values.
Insert Figure 6 here
In the base model we assumed that all production costs are variable. Here, we briefly discuss
the eﬀect of fixed operating costs, which we refer to as operating leverage. For this purpose, we
assume that all firms must bear an additional (instantaneous) cost, , that is independent of the
quantity produced, and that a merger reduces the combined fixed costs from 2 to . Allowing
for this possibility in the base model is equivalent to the extension discussed above with respect to the
increasing returns to scale. In particular, because the merging firms derive additional benefits from
combining their operations and because entry is less profitable due to the increased operating costs, a
merger attempt is optimal for a wider range of the states of demand. If  is high enough, it becomes
optimal to merge regardless of the state of the industry, while the two thresholds persist for lower
values of the fixed costs.
Diﬀerently from the eﬀect of varying returns to scale, however, the existence of fixed costs also
creates incentives to exit the industry at very low states of demand. A detailed analysis of exit is
beyond the scope of the current discussion, but it can be shown that as long as the fixed cost of
operating a firm is suﬃciently low, 2   −  , the qualitative results of the model are not
aﬀected by the introduction of the possibility to exit the industry, in the sense that the incumbents
still have incentives to postpone a merger attempt between them for intermediate values of  in order
to delay entry into the industry. The analysis of merger synergies results in the following empirical
prediction.
Prediction 4. A U-shaped relation between horizontal merger intensity and the state of demand is
more likely in industries in which potential operating synergies are smaller - i.e., in industries in which
24The value of available synergies is likely lower than 5.8% in many deals (e.g., Kaplan (2000) and Bruner (2004,
2005)).
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production displays lower returns to scale and/or requires lower operating leverage.
2.5.3 Analysis of oligopolistic industries
The duopoly framework of the base model allows a simple and intuitive illustration of the strategic
costs and benefits of merging when there is a threat of potential entry into an oligopolistic industry.
Here, we relax the duopoly assumption and discuss how the presence of  incumbent firms aﬀects
the incentives of any two of them to exercise an option to attempt a merger. Not only an analysis
of an industry in which some incumbents are not part of a merger attempt highlights the eﬀects of
industry structure on incentives to merge in pursuit of market power, but it also illustrates the eﬀects
of successful and unsuccessful merger attempts on industry rivals of merging firms.
Like in the duopoly case, the optimal restructuring thresholds are aﬀected by whether the merger
entails out-of-pocket costs and/or produces synergies. In general, higher level of competitive interaction
reduces instantaneous profits for all incumbent firms. As a result, both the strategic benefit and
strategic cost resulting from a merger between two incumbent firms are increasingly lower as the
number of incumbents increases. The incumbents’ incentives to merge at the lower threshold decrease
and eventually disappear as out-of-pocket merger costs increase. This eﬀect, intuitively, depends on
the degree of industry concentration. In more competitive industries, the strategic benefit of merging
is lower and, thus, relatively lower restructuring costs are suﬃcient to eliminate the incumbents’
incentives to merge when the industry is contracting. In such cases, pro-cyclical mergers should be
more likely. Conversely, as our earlier analysis shows, the strategic benefit of merging is higher and it
may outweigh the merger cost in more concentrated industries, leading to a U-shaped relation between
state of demand and merger activity. Figure 7 illustrates this intuition, by plotting the optimal merger
thresholds for two cases: three incumbent firms (the left panel) and four incumbent firms (the right
panel).
Insert Figure 7 here
The comparison of Figure 4 (two incumbents) and the two panels of Figure 7 (three and four in-
cumbents) shows that, given the same restructuring cost, a U-shaped relation between the state of
the demand and merger intensity is more likely in more concentrated industries (lower number of
firms). Assuming that merger synergies are available in this setting has an eﬀect similar to that of the
restructuring cost. The discussion above leads to the following prediction.
Prediction 5. A U-shaped relation between horizontal merger intensity and the state of demand is
more likely in more concentrated industries.
Figure 8 presents the return to a single rival incumbent firm that is not a part of merger at the
time of successful merger attempt between two other incumbent firms at the lower merger threshold,
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 (dashed line) and at the lower edge of the upper merger range,  (solid line) as functions of the
degree of competitive interaction, .
Insert Figure 8 here
Figure 8 shows that the return to the rival firm depends crucially on the eﬀect of a successful merger
attempt on the timing of entry. A successful merger attempt in a low state of demand does not cause
immediate entry and, therefore, has a substantial positive eﬀect on the rival. On the other hand, a
successful merger attempt in a high state of demand leads to immediate entry, mitigating the positive
eﬀect of merger on rival’s value. The magnitude of the eﬀect on the rival is increasing in the degree
of competitive interaction, , when a merger attempt is initiated at the lower threshold  because
the immediate positive eﬀect of the merger on the rival’s profit is increasing in . This relation is
non-monotonic at the upper threshold  as it becomes more sensitive to the timing of entry, which
itself is a function of 25 The opposite picture arises when a merger attempt is unsuccessful: the
return to the rival following failed merger is substantially more negative at the lower threshold 
than at the upper threshold .26 Figure 8 and the discussion above lead to the following empirical
prediction.
Prediction 6. Under competition in strategic substitutes (e.g., quantities), the returns to rival firms
around horizontal merger announcements are likely to be higher in times of decreasing demand than
in times of rising demand. The returns to rivals around merger challenges are expected to be lower in
times of declining demand than in times of increasing demand.
This prediction illustrates that controlling for the state of industry demand is crucial when one
examines the eﬀects of a horizontal merger on rival firms. Eckbo (1983) reports generally insignificant
positive returns to rivals around horizontal merger announcements and around merger challenges by
antitrust authorities. It would be interesting to extend Eckbo’s (1983) analysis of rivals’ reactions
to merger announcements and challenges while controlling for the state of industry demand. More
recently, empirical studies by Fee and Thomas (2004) and Shahrur (2005) build on Eckbo’s original
work by examining the eﬀect of horizontal mergers on customers and suppliers and find little support
for the market (or buying) power hypothesis. Our analysis implies that the anticompetitive eﬀects of
mergers vary with the state of industry demand and, thus, so should the eﬀect of mergers on firms’
customers and suppliers. Therefore, it may be important to control for the state of the industry when
assessing the eﬀects of mergers along the supply chain.
25Similar quantitative results are obtained in an industry with multiple incumbents that do not participate in a merger.
26Because the probability of a successful merger attempt, , in our base case equals 05, the rival’s returns following an
unsuccessful attempt at  and  have exactly the same magnitudes but opposite signs as those following a successful
merger. The corresponding figure is available upon request.
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Although a full-fledged empirical analysis of the relation between industry demand and merger
activity is beyond the scope of this paper, in the next section we test two of the main predictions of
the model. First, we test Prediction 1, of a U-shaped relation between horizontal merger intensity
and the state of industry demand. Second, we test Prediction 5 by examining whether such U-shaped
relation is more pronounced in relatively concentrated industries.
3 Empirical tests
3.1 Data
The sample of mergers and acquisitions oﬀers is from the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) database
of public and private U.S. targets. The sample period is 1981 — 2004. To be included in the sample,
we require that a deal satisfies the following criteria:
1) the acquirer is a U.S.-based public company, traded on one of the three major U.S. exchanges
(NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX);
2) the acquiring firm owns less than 50% of the target firm’s equity on the day of acquisition an-
nouncement;
3) the acquiring firm ultimately acquires a larger than 50% stake of the target’s equity;
4) the deal value is available from SDC.
We impose the first restriction to allow matching of the acquiring firms from SDC with the COM-
PUSTAT Annual Industrial Files, which we use to define industries and to obtain industry charac-
teristics. We exclude foreign bidders because their incentives to cross-list may be related to factors
other than their desire to gain access to U.S. product markets. It is not obvious, then, that foreign
cross-listed acquirers seek to actively compete in U.S. product markets and have the same strategic
incentives as U.S. firms.27
The second restriction reflects the fact that control over managerial (output/pricing) decisions
is more relevant for our model and empirical tests than the legal status of the target.28 The third
restriction eliminates unsuccessful bids from the sample. In our model, the probability of an attempted
merger being successful is fixed, and the predictions of the model could, in principle, be tested using
both a sample of attempted mergers and a sample of completed mergers. Empirically, however, it is
often the case that multiple bidders make oﬀers for the same target. To the extent that the degree of
27 In particular, access to U.S. supply of capital and benefits of complying with U.S. regulation of shareholder protection
are widely cited as potential advantages of cross-listing (e.g., Stulz (1999), Reese and Weisbach (2002), Doidge, Karolyi,
and Stulz (2004), and Lins, Strickland and Zenner (2005)).
28For robustness, we redo all tests while imposing various restrictions on the threshold determining a corporate control
change (i.e. 40% or 30%). The results based on these samples are qualitatively similar to those reported and are available
upon request.
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competition among bidders is diﬀerent across industries, using all attempted mergers might bias the
results.29 We base our measure of merger intensity on deal values, hence the fourth restriction.
We obtain firm-year-level accounting information and SIC codes from COMPUSTAT. As in Har-
ford (2005), we define industries following Fama and French’s (1997) classification, which combines
four-digit SIC codes into 49 broader industries. The previous selection criteria, together with the
COMPUSTAT matching requirement for acquiring firms result in a sample of 21,245 completed merg-
ers. Our model predicts a non-monotonic relation between the state of industry demand and firms’
incentives to engage in horizontal mergers. We classify a merger as horizontal (non-horizontal) if the
transaction involves two firms operating in the same (diﬀerent) Fama-French industry.30 Based on
this classification, there are 12,269 horizontal deals in our sample.
3.2 Merger intensities
We measure (horizontal) merger intensity in industry  during year  as the sum of the values of all
(horizontal) deals involving acquirers in industry  in year  scaled by the sum of end-of-year market
values of all firms belonging to the industry in year − 1. A firm’s market value is defined as the sum
of the market value of its equity and the book value of its liabilities.
The theory we propose focuses on horizontal merges. Nonetheless, we also examine the relation
between overall merger intensity and the state of demand because the definition of a horizontal merger
is not straightforward, both theoretically and empirically. On the theory side, our model allows
for diﬀerent values of the parameter measuring the substitutability among firms’ products, thus not
requiring the products to be perfect substitutes. On the empirical side, the definition of industries,
which is based on SIC codes, is far from perfect.31
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the absolute and scaled measures of merger intensity for
the sample of all mergers and for the sample of horizontal mergers.
Insert Table 1 here
Panel A presents the summary statistics for the entire sample. The mean (median) annual number
of mergers within an industry is 17 (7), out of which 10 (3) are horizontal. The mean (median)
merger intensity is 2.45% (1.08%) for all mergers and 1.17% (0.35%) for horizontal mergers. Panel B
presents the mean number of mergers and mean merger intensity for the five most active industries
29The results obtained using the sample of succesful and withdrawn merger and acquisition bids are similar to those
obtained using the successful mergers sample, and are available upon request.
30 In the case of private targets we obtain the industry classification codes from SDC.
31See Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1984) for a discussion of the deficiencies of SIC industry classification as a
measure of economic markets. Also, see Kahle and Walkling (1997) for a discussion of the deficiencies of publicly
available data on SIC codes.
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over the whole sample period: candy and soda, health care, shipbuilding and railroad equipment,
coal, and banking. Panel C lists the years with the highest merger intensities. Consistent with a
widely documented trend, the second part of the nineties is associated with an all-time peak in merger
activity.
3.3 The state of demand and control variables
In the model, stochastic shocks to the representative consumer’s utility translate into shocks to demand
for firms’ products. Firms’ revenues are monotonically increasing in the state of demand. Therefore,
we use the industry-year median annual sales growth to proxy for the state of demand. Specifically, for
each firm-year, we calculate annual sales growth, defined as the diﬀerence between the firm’s annual
sales and its previous year’s sales, both scaled by the latter. Then, for each Fama-French industry, we
use the annual median sales growth. Using a revenue-growth-based measure of demand shocks is quite
common in the literature (e.g., Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) and Mitchell and Mulherin (1996)).32
To control for other determinants of industry-level merger activity, we follow recent studies of
merger waves (e.g., Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Andrade and Staﬀord (2004), and Harford (2005)).
All control variables are measured at the previous year-end for each industry and/or year, and include:
a) median asset market-to-book ratio and b) its standard deviation; c) median three-year annual stock
return; d) median property, plant, and equipment to assets ratio; e) average commercial and industrial
loans spread; f) deregulation shocks; and other non-demand shocks comprising g) median cash flow
margin, h) median asset turnover, i) median research and development expenses, j) median capital
expenditures, and k) median return on assets. The detailed definition of and the motivation for
including each variable are provided in Appendix 2.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the annual sales growth and the control variables, as
well as the correlation between the control variables and sales growth.
Insert Table 2 here
Notably, although some of the correlations are statistically significant, none of them exceed 0.19.
This is comforting, in the sense that our metric of the state of demand is unlikely to proxy for other
determinants of merger intensity. In some of the tests, we partition industries based on the level of
industry concentration. We use two standard measures of concentration. The first one is the industry’s
Herfindahl index, defined as the ratio of the sum of firms’ squared sales to the squared sum of their
sales. The second one is the number of firms in the industry. Both the Herfindahl index and the
32We obtain results similar to those reported below using profit-based measures of demand shocks, such as the change
in industry median profit margin. This finding is not overly surprising given that the correlation between sales-based
and profit-based measures is on the order of 40% at the industry level. Similar results are also obtained when we use
measures based on shocks to productive inputs, such as the median change in the number of employees.
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number of firms display large variation, ranging between 0.013 and 0.896 and between 2 and 962,
respectively.
3.4 Relation between industry sales growth and merger intensity
The main prediction of the model is that firms’ strategic incentives to merge vary non-monotonically
with the state of demand and, as a result, higher horizontal merger activity should be associated with
larger positive or negative industry demand shocks (Prediction 1). Furthermore, the U-shaped relation
between the state of the industry demand and horizontal merger intensity should be more pronounced
in relatively concentrated industries (Prediction 5).
Our empirical strategy is two-pronged. First, we assume that the relation between merger intensity
and the state of demand is quadratic and estimate the following model:
  = + 1( ) + 2( )2 + (27)
+0 + () +  ( ) + 
where  is the vector of control variables listed earlier,  and   are industry and year
indicator variables that capture industry- and year-specific fixed eﬀects, respectively. A U-shaped
relation between merger intensity and the state of demand implies that 1  0 and 2  0. Because
the dependent variable is bounded below at zero and the variance of the error term may vary across
industries and time, we estimate the model by fitting a random-eﬀects tobit model.
The drawback of the specification in (27) is that our theoretical model is silent about the exact
functional form of the relation between merger intensity and the state of demand. Therefore, as an
alternative to (27), we estimate a semi-parametric regression model, which traces the dependence
of a response variable on a predictor without previous specification of the functional form. There
are several methods of nonparametric estimation and most, but not all, assume that the regression
function is smooth.33 Three common methods are kernel estimation, local-polynomial regression,
which is a generalization of the kernel estimation, and smoothing splines.34 The mathematical basis
for smoothing splines is more satisfying than for kernel or local polynomial regression, since an explicit
criterion of fit is optimized, thus we rely on this approach in our analysis (e.g. Fox (2000b)).
We use a semi-parametric regression model of the following form:
  = + 1( ) + ( ) + (28)
+0 + () +  ( ) + 
33See Bowman and Azzalini (1997), Fox (2000a, b), Hastie and Tibshirani (1986, 1990), Hastie, Tibshirani, and
Freedman (2001), and Simonoﬀ (1996) for a review of non-parametric regression analysis.
34 In recent years, the semiparametric regression method gained popularity in the finance literature. For instance,
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) use kernel estimation in their analysis of the flow-performance relation in mutual funds and
Coval and Shumway (2006) use semi-parametric estimation in their investigation of traders’ risk-taking behavior.
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where all the variables and parameters in (28) have the same interpretation as in (27), except for the
fact that the smooth function  is not given a parametric form. Our estimation relies on Hastie and
Tibshirani’s (1986) iterative local scoring algorithm.
Panel A of Table 3 presents the estimates of the parametric model. Panel B provides selected
statistics of the semi-parametric model, namely the estimate of the linear component of sales growth
and its significance, and the 2 test statistic for the non-linear component of sales growth. In addition,
Figure 9 plots the relation between the residualized (adjusted) dependent variable ( )
and  , which summarizes the eﬀect of the latter in the overall model.
Insert Table 3 and Figure 9 here
Column 1 reports the models’ estimates for the full sample, which includes horizontal and non-
horizontal mergers. The sign and statistical significance of the coeﬃcient estimates for sales growth
and squared sales growth (i.e., b1  0 and b2  0) are consistent with the notion that there is a U-
shaped relation between merger intensity and the state of demand. Furthermore, the implied minimum
of the relation, -
1
22 = 021, falls within the range of observed values of sales growth. The signs of
the coeﬃcient estimates for the other control variables are generally consistent with those reported
in previous studies (e.g., Harford (2005)). Specifically, industries with abundant assets in place and
those subject to non-demand-related shocks are characterized by lower merger intensities.
Similar to the estimates of model (27) in Panel A, the semi-parametric estimates in Panel B also
support the existence of a U-shaped relation between merger intensity and the state of demand. In
particular, the 2 test statistic supports rejection of the hypothesis that this relation is linear. Also,
it is apparent from Figure 9a that this relation is non-monotonic. The figure, which plots the eﬀect of
industry sales growth on predicted merger intensity and the 95% confidence intervals for the plotted
values, also indicates that this eﬀect may be asymmetric, with negative demand shocks having a larger
impact on merger intensity than positive shocks.
The evidence for the overall (horizontal and non-horizontal) merger intensity is in line with the
predictions of our model. It is, however, also consistent with technology-driven models. Indeed,
Lambrecht’s (2004) and Lambrecht and Myers’ (2007) models jointly predict that merger activity
should be higher in rising and declining industries, respectively. Unlike these models, however, our
model specifically focuses on horizontal mergers.35 Therefore, in columns 2 and 3 of Table 3, we
separately present the estimates of (27) and (28) for horizontal and non-horizontal mergers.
35Note that both Lambrecht’s (2004) and Lambrecht and Myers’ (2007) models assume that the same stochastic process
drives the profits of all firms and, therefore, may be deemed models of horizontal mergers. However, there is nothing
in these models that requires both the bidder and target to belong to the same industry. The assumption of perfectly
correlated cash flows substantially improves these models’ tractability, however it is not essential for their results. As
long as there are synergies and managerial ineﬃciency, there are incentives to merge regardless of whether the bidder
and target belong to the same industry. In our model, on the other hand, mergers are by construction horizontal.
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Both the parametric and semi-parametric estimates in column 2 support the main prediction of
our model. In the sample of horizontal mergers, the non-monotonic relation between merger intensity
and sales growth is both statistically and economically significant. In Panel A, positive (negative)
coeﬃcients on (squared) sales growth are significant. In Panel B, the 2 test statistic suggests sub-
stantial nonlinearities in the relation between merger intensity and the state of demand. Finally, the
U-shaped relation depicted in Figure 9b for horizontal mergers is somewhat more pronounced than
what is evinced in Figure 9a for all mergers.
The evidence for non-horizontal merger activity, reported in column 3 of Table 3 and in Figure 9c,
is notably diﬀerent. In particular, there is no indication that non-horizontal merger intensity is related
to industry demand shocks, as confirmed by the insignificant 2 statistic in Panel B and the overall
eﬀect of sales growth on merger intensity in Figure 9c. Therefore, when strategic considerations are
likely to be absent or, at least, less preponderant, merger intensity appears to be unrelated to the
state of demand.
In Table 4, we analyze whether the U-shaped relation between merger intensity and demand
shocks depends on the degree of industry concentration (Prediction 5). This analysis may further
diﬀerentiate our model from the predictions in Lambrecht (2004) and Lambrecht and Myers (2007),
whose models abstract from industry concentration. Conversely, we predict that, as a result of strategic
considerations, the U-shaped relation between horizontal merger intensity and demand shocks should
be stronger in more concentrated industries. To test this prediction, we partition industries each year
by whether common measures of industry concentration — the sales-based Herfindahl index and the
number of firms in the industry — are above/below yearly median. For each subsample, Panel A of
Table 4 reports the estimates of model (27), whereas Panel B and Figure 10 present the estimates of
the semi-parametric model (28).
Insert Table 4 and Figure 10 here
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 report estimates for industries with low and high Herfindahl indexes,
respectively. For less concentrated industries (i.e., low Herfindahl indexes), the parametric model
estimates imply that merger intensity increases linearly with the state of demand. Consistent with the
parametric results, the 2 statistic in Panel B indicates that the non-linear component does not explain
a significant portion of the variation in merger intensity, as also confirmed by the graph in Figure 10a.
For more concentrated industries (i.e., high Herfindahl index), on the other hand, the evidence shows
that the relation between horizontal merger intensity and sales growth is non-monotonic, as predicted
by our model. In the parametric model, the coeﬃcient estimates for sales growth and squared sales
growth are negative and positive, respectively, and both are statistically significant at the 1% level.
The semi-parametric estimation, summarized in Panel B of Table 4 and Figure 10b, supports similar
inference, in the sense that horizontal merger intensity exhibits a clear U-shaped relation with the
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state of demand.
When we partition the sample based on the number firms in an industry, we reach similar con-
clusions. In particular, in industries with more firms (column 4 of Table 4 and Figure 10d), both
the parametric and semi-parametric test statistics lead to rejection of the hypothesis that the relation
between merger activity and the state of demand is non-monotonic. Conversely, in more concentrated
industries (i.e., low number of firms, column 3 and Figure 10c), all tests are consistent with the notion
that horizontal merger intensity increases during periods of large negative or positive demand shocks.
Overall, the evidence in Table 4 and Figure 10 is consistent with our model. In particular, the non-
monotonic relation between horizontal merger intensity and the state of demand holds within more
concentrated industries only.
4 Conclusions
This paper presents a real-options model that highlights the strategic costs and benefits of horizontal
mergers in oligopolistic industries, while allowing for potential entry. The model endogenizes firms’
merger and entry decisions and demonstrates that firms’ propensity to engage in horizontal mergers
is highest when industry demand experiences especially large positive and negative shocks. This
result follows from the strategic interaction between the existing firms (incumbents) and the potential
entrant. The strategic benefit in this setting is that a merger allows the incumbents to coordinate their
product marker strategies, increasing their combined profits. Yet, the reduced level of competition
also produces a strategic cost by enticing new firms to enter the industry, given higher post-merger
prices and potential profits. During periods of large positive demand shocks, the incumbents cannot
deter entry by not merging. During periods of negative shocks, the strategic costs stemming from
increased likelihood of future entry are more than oﬀset by the strategic collusion benefits. Therefore,
in extreme states of demand merger activity becomes more likely. Conversely, in intermediate states
the incumbents may be better oﬀ not merging to deter entry.
This paper is the first to a) endogenize firms’ merger and entry decisions in a dynamic framework,
and b) demonstrate that strategic considerations are consistent with the higher propensity of firms
to merge horizontally in periods of positive and negative demand shocks. In addition to the stylistic
model highlighting the intuition behind strategic mergers, we examine how realistic features, such
as operating synergies, restructuring costs, operating leverage, and oligopolistic industry structure
aﬀect firms’ strategic incentives to merge. These extensions of the model generate additional testable
implications.
In the second part of the paper, we test the main predictions of the model using parametric
and semi-parametric methods. The empirical evidence supports the main predictions of the model. In
particular, first, we document a U-shaped relation between merger intensity and industry sales growth,
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consistent with previous empirical studies. Second, for the first time, we show that this relation is
exclusively driven by horizontal merger activity. Finally, consistent with the model, we find that the
U-shaped relation between horizontal merger activity and demand shocks is observed only in more
concentrated industries, in which strategic considerations are likely to be more pronounced.
There are numerous potential avenues for further developing the link between merger timing and
competition in product markets. On the theory side, it may be worth extending our model to allow for
more than two incumbents that are allowed to merge and more than one potential entrant. This would
allow examining the eﬀects of strategic considerations on the timing of merger waves, and the relation
of the latter to the industry life cycle. Also, it would be useful to examine the eﬀects of strategic
mergers in diﬀerent states of industry demand on welfare. Such an analysis could be useful in the
antitrust authorities’ decision making process. On the empirical side, testing additional predictions of
the model could shed more light on the link between M&A activity and product market competition.
In addition, a detailed industry-specific analysis of the relation between merger activity and demand
conditions may enhance our understanding of the strategic motives to merge.
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Appendix
Appendix 1 — Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
(i) Assume first that a potential entrant has stayed out of the industry. Then, under the assump-
tions that  = 1,  = 1, and  = 1, the instantaneous profit function of each of the two incumbents
is
 =  − 2  (29)
where  ∈ {1 2}. Substituting the demand for product  in (4) into , partially diﬀerentiating the
profit function of each firm with respect to its own price, equalizing the resulting two expressions to
zero, and solving the resulting system of two first-order conditions yields the equilibrium profits of the
two incumbents. Their combined profit in the case of no merger is given by
(no entry, no merger) = 2
2(2− 2)
(4 +  − 2)2  (30)
If the two firms merge, their combined profit is
 = 11 + 22 − 21 − 22 (31)
assuming separate production (no technological synergies), or
 = 11 + 22 − (1 + 2)
2
2
 (32)
assuming joint production (technological synergies). As discussed in the body of the paper, the two
specifications lead to identical results. Substituting the demand in (4) into 1 and 2, and partially
diﬀerentiating (31) or (32) with respect to 1 and 2 produces a system of two first order conditions.
Solving the resulting system leads to the following equilibrium profit of the joint firm:
(no entry, merger) = 
2
2(2 + )  (33)
Subtracting (30) from (33) gives
(no entry, merger)− (no entry, no merger) = (34)
=
22(1 + )2
2(2 + )(4 +  − 2)2  0
Now consider the case in which the entrant has decided to enter the industry. The entrant’s profit
function, given in (29), results in a third first-order condition, similar to those of the incumbents.
Solving the system of three first order conditions for the merger case and the no-merger case yields
the following equilibrium profits of the incumbents:
(entry, no merger) = 
2(1 + )(1 +  − 2)
(2 + 3)2  (35)
and
(entry, merger) = 
2(4 + 3 − 32)2(2 +  − 22)
2(1 + )2(8 + 4 − 92 + 23)2  (36)
Subtracting (35) from (36) gives
(entry, merger)− (entry, no merger) =
=
22(1− )(2 + 1)(8 + 52 + 882 + 3 − 814 − 105 + 266 − 47)
2(1 + )2(2 + 3)2(8 + 4 − 92 + 23)2  (37)
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Given that 0     = 1, both the numerator and the denominator of (37) are clearly positive.
(ii) Solving the system of three first-order conditions provides the following equilibrium instanta-
neous profits of the entrant conditional on whether the incumbents have merged:
(no merger) = 
2(1 + )(1 +  − 2)
2(2 + 3)2  (38)
and
(merger) = 2
2(2− 2)2(1 +  − 2)
(1 + )(8 + 4 − 92 + 23)2  (39)
Comparing (39) and (38) results in the following expression:
(merger)− (no merger) =
22(1− )(1 + 2)(1 +  − 2)(16 + 24 − 92 − 133 + 24)
2(2 + 3)2(1 + )(8 + 4 − 92 + 23)2  (40)
Both the numerator and the denominator of (40) are positive for 0    1.
(iii) Comparing the incumbents’ joint instantaneous profit in the case of merger and subsequent
entry in (36), with their combined profit when they do not merge and no entry occurs in (30), leads
to the result. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2
Once the option to attempt a merger has been exercised, the entry problem of the outsider becomes
equivalent to the standard problem of investment under uncertainty. Denote the instantaneous profit
of the outsider upon entry by  where  =  if the merger attempt is successful and  = 
otherwise. Then it can be easily shown (see, for example, McDonald and Siegel (1986) or Dixit and
Pindyck (1994)) that the optimal entry threshold is given by
∗ = ( − )
1
1 − 1  (41)
where 1 is given in (14). ¥
Proof of Lemma 3
In this proof we refer to the “value of the potential entrant”   () as the value realized in the
case in which entry precedes the merger attempt. Using standard arguments, it can be shown that
the pre-investment value of the potential entrant satisfies the following ODE:
1
2
22 () +  ()−   () = 0 (42)
where  and  refer to the first and second derivatives of the entrant’s value with respect to respectively. The solution to (42) is given in (16).
The value-matching condition (18) equates the pre-investment value of the potential entrant with
its value immediately after the exercise of the entry option. The latter is given by the weighted average
of its value in the case in which the merger attempt that follows entry is successful and in the case in
which it failed. Since the (upper) entry threshold,  is optimally chosen by the outsider (and not
by the incumbents), the appropriate smooth-pasting condition in (19) must hold for  to ensure the
optimality of the upper merging threshold.
Finally, at a stopping time upon reaching the (lower) merging threshold, the incumbents exercise
their option to attempt a merger. Again, the value of the potential entrant is a weighted average of
its values in the case of a successful merger attempt and the case of an unsuccessful merger attempt.
This value is found on the right-hand side in the value-matching condition (20). ¥
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Proof of Lemma 4
Similarly to the value of the entrant, the pre-merger value of each incumbent satisfies the following
ODE:
1
2
22() + ()− () +   = 0 (43)
where  and  refer to the first and second derivatives of the incumbent’s value with respect
to  respectively. The solution to (43) is given in (21). To ensure optimality, the value-matching
conditions (22) and (23) together with the smooth-pasting condition (24) are imposed. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1
At each  ∈ R+, define the game h|{  }Π|{  } (%)i  where  = {} is the
set of players (the incumbents and entrant respectively),  is the set of actions available to them:
{} (merger, wait) in the case of the incumbents, and {} (enter, wait) in the case of the
entrant.  refers to the state of the incumbents at : {} (the incumbents have successfully
merged prior to reaching , the incumbents had an unsuccessful merger attempt prior to reaching ,
the incumbents did not try to merge yet).  is the state of the entrant at : {} (the
entrant has entered prior to  the entrant has not entered yet).  () can be played by the entrant
(incumbents) only if  =  ( = ).  is always played by the entrant (incumbents) when =  ( =  or  = ). Π is the set of payoﬀs that the players obtain by playing the
available strategies. The incumbents’/entrant’s payoﬀs are defined as their respective values at 
conditional on the state of the game at  and the players’ actions at , ()|{(  ) ( )}
and ()|{(  ) ( )} respectively.
We begin by showing that the game does not have a subgame-perfect equilibrium that involves
pure strategies in all subgames. First, note that the entrant’s strategy at  is  if  = ,
regardless of  . Second, note that the entrant’s strategy at    is  regardless of  and . Thus, a pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium could only occur with the entrant playing 
at  ∈ [ ] Assume that the entrant’s strategy is to play  at  belonging to this range.
Then, the incumbent’s optimal response is to play  at . The reason is as follows. The incumbents’
payoﬀ from playing  when  =  ,  = , and  =  is
()|{() ()} =   () + (1− )  () (44)
where   () =
R∞
 −(−)  = 

− and   () =
R∞
 −(−)  = 

− . The
incumbents’ payoﬀ from playing  is
()|{() ()} =
Z +

−(−) +
−(+−)(  (+ ) + (1− )  (+ )) (45)
The second of the two terms in (45) follows from the fact that the incumbents’ optimal strategy
at  +  facing + =  and + =  is to play  . The reason is that   
(see (6)). The diﬀerence between the payoﬀ from playing  at  and playing  at  is, thusR +
 −(−)( −  )  0.
If the incumbents’ optimal strategy is to play  at , then the entrant’s optimal response is to
play  at  as long as   . The reason is as follows. The entrant’s payoﬀ from playing  is
()|{() ()} =  () + (1− )  () (46)
where   () = − +
R∞
 −(−) = − + 
− and   () = − +
R∞
 −(−) =
− + − . The entrant’s payoﬀ from playing  is
()|{() ( )} =   () + (1− )−(−)  () (47)
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The diﬀerence between the payoﬀs in (47) and (46) is (1 − )(  () − −(−)  ()),
which is positive for  ∈ [ ) by the definition of . This means that the entrant prefers
to deviate from his strategy () and to play  at , implying that the solution involving the entrant
playing  at  ∈ [ ) is not a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
The last candidate for a subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies is the entrant playing  at
 if  = , regardless of  . However, it is easy to show that the value of the entrant
if it plays  at  facing  =  and  =   () + (1 − )  (), is higher
than its value if it plays  at , which is −(−)( () + (1− )  ()). In
other words, the entrant would like to deviate from playing  at , implied by the conjectured
strategy of playing  at , and play  at  instead. This contradiction leads to the conclusion
that a strategy profile including the entrant playing  at    (including  = ) and playing
 at  if  = , regardless of  is not a subgame-perfect equilibrium, and, in general, the
game does not have a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which the incumbents and entrant play pure
strategies in each subgame.
We now prove that the first mixed-strategy equilibrium proposed in Proposition 4 is indeed
subgame-perfect. First, it follows from (15) and (13) that if the incumbents’ strategy is to play
 at  then the entrant’s optimal response is to play  at  if the merger is successful and to
play  at  if the merger attempt fails. The incumbents’ optimal response to this strategy of
the entrant is to merge at . Thus, the incumbents’ strategy of playing  at  and the entrants
waiting until  or  depending on whether the merger attempt succeeds is a subgame-perfect
equilibrium from which neither of the players would rationally deviate.
As shown above, the only possible subgame-perfect equilibrium in the range  ∈ [ ) has to
involve mixed strategies at least in some subgames. Assume that in the range  ∈ [ ), given
 =  and  = , the entrant plays  with probability () and plays  with probability
(1− ()). Similarly, assume that in that range, the incumbents play  with probability () and
play  with probability (1 − ()). In order for the entrant and the incumbents to not want to
deviate from these mixed strategy profiles at any  ∈ [ ), the following conditions must hold:
()|{() (∗)} = ()|{() (∗)} (48)
and
()|{() (∗  )} = ()|{() (∗  )} (49)
where (∗ ∗) are the equilibrium actions of the incumbents and the entrant, respectively. Using
(48) we can write
()|{() (∗)} = ()|{() (∗)} = ()()|{() ()}+
(1− ())E
∙Z +

−(−) + −(+−)(+ )|{() (∗)}
¸

(50)
Condition (50) can be rewritten as
()|{() (∗)} = ()()|{() ()}+
(1− ())
∙
 1 − 1 −  + (1−
1
 )(+ )|{() (
∗)}
¸
 (51)
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where 1 is given in (14). Solving (51) for () gives
() = lim→0
1

()|{() (∗)}−  (+ )|{() (∗)}(1−1 )−  1−1− 
()|{() ()}− (1− 1 ) (+ )|{() (∗)}−  1−1− 
=
=
−()|{()(∗)} + ()|{() (∗)}1 − 1−1−
()|{() ()}−  ()|{() (∗)}  (52)
Note that
()|{() (∗)} =  


 − +(1−)
Ã



 −  +
∙ 

¸1  −  − 
!
 (53)
and
()|{() ()} =  


 −  + (1− )

 −   (54)
After simplifications of (52) we obtain
() = (1 − 1)(

 −  )
(1− )( −  )
µ
1−
h  i1−1¶  (55)
Similarly, it follows from (49) that for each  ∈ [ ) we can write
()|{() (∗  )} = ()|{() (∗  )} = ()()|{() ( )}+
(1− ())E
h
(−(+−)(+ )|{() (∗  )}
i
 (56)
Using transformations similar to (51) and (52), we arrive at
() = −
()|{()(∗ )} + ()|{() (∗  )}1
()|{() ( )}− ()|{() (∗  )}  (57)
Noting that
()|{() (∗  )} = − +  

 −  + (1− )

 −  (58)
and
()|{() ( )} = 
µ
− +  

 − 
¶
+ (1− )
Ã∙ 

¸1 ∙− +   − 
¸!
 (59)
we obtain
() =
− 1 + (1 − 1)
³
− + (1− )
−
´
(1− )
µh 

i1 h− +  − i− h− + − i¶  (60)
Importantly, the denominator of (60) is always positive (by the definition of ), while the
numerator is positive for   , zero for  = , and negative for   . To see that, equating the
numerator of (60) to zero results in
 = 11 − 1
( − )
[ + (1− ) ]  (61)
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Equation (61), which is similar to (13) and (15), is the entry threshold for the case in which the merger
attempt has not occurred yet, . Thus, ()  0 for  ∈ [ ), () = 0 for  = , and
()  0 for  ∈ [ ). This means that there are no subgame-perfect equilibria in which the
entrant plays  in the region   . Intuitively, the condition in (49), stipulating that the entrant
is indiﬀerent between playing  or  , required for the existence of equilibrium in mixed strategies,
can not hold in the region [ ) because in this region the entrant is always better oﬀ waiting
than entering unilaterally. Thus, the subgame-perfect equilibrium involves the incumbents playing 
at each  ∈ [ ) with a probability given in (60) when they face  =  and  =  , and
playing  otherwise, and the entrant playing  with the probability given in (55) and playing 
otherwise when it faces  =  and  =  . In the region [ ) the incumbents play  as
soon as they observe  =  and the entrant plays  as soon as it observes  = . If the entrant
observes  =  and if  =  in the region [ ), then the entrant plays  . This
concludes the proof that the strategy profile discussed above is indeed a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
The probability densities of unilateral entry and merger in (55) and (60) respectively are presented
in Figure A.1.
Insert Figure A.1 here
The left panel in Figure A.1 depicts the probability densities of unilateral merger, () for all
 ∈ [ ) while the right panel depicts the probability densities of unilateral entry, ().
The intuition for the shapes of the curves in Figure A.1 is as follows. Because  is obtained as
the solution to the optimization problem of the entrant when incumbents never merge before entry,
the entrant is indiﬀerent between entering at  and entering at a slightly higher value  +  (the
smooth-pasting condition holds). In the subgame-perfect equilibrium the entrant is still indiﬀerent
between entering at  and +  Therefore, for this condition to hold, the equilibrium probability
of initiating a merger attempt at  has to be equal to zero, () = 0 On the other hand, at  =
 the entrant finds it optimal to enter even if the probability of merger is equal to one, as there is
no incentive for the entrant to wait at this point. Therefore, in order to make the entrant indiﬀerent
between entering and staying aside, () has to grow to infinity as →  Similarly, the benefit of
not merging for the incumbents is their ability to deter entry. However, entry deterrence is infeasible
for values of  exceeding  Therefore, as  approaches  the benefit of entry deterrence
diminishes and therefore must be compensated by the higher probability of entry, consistent with the
graph in the left panel of Figure A.1.
Interestingly, in the subgame-perfect equilibrium involving mixed strategies, merger attempt and
entry are most likely to occur close to  because as →  the denominators of both (55) and
(60) approach zero. Importantly, however, the diﬀerence between  (equalling 1.185 in the base
case) and  (equalling 1.152) is relatively small compared to the diﬀerence between  and 
(equalling 0.805).
Proof of Lemma 5
(i) If the cost of merger is relatively low, there are still two optimal merger thresholds, and a merger
attempt occurs at the first passage time of the demand shock to either of them. To formally analyze
this case, one needs to replace equations (22) and (23) with the following two boundary conditions.
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These conditions reflect the fact the joint value of the merged firm is reduced by  following a
successful merger attempt (and the value of each incumbent is reduced by 2 since each incumbent
obtains a 50% stake of the joint firm).
(ii) As in the base-case model, the incumbents wait as long as they can deter entry and initiate a
merger attempt at the moment when entry deterrence is no longer feasible. Similar to (13) and (15),
it is straightforward to show that in this case the upper merger threshold is given by
 = 11 − 1
( − )
 + (1− )  (62)
and the value of each incumbent is equal to:
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(iii) Standard analysis yields that in this case the optimal merger threshold, , is given by
 = 11 − 1
( − )
2 ( −  )  (63)
while the optimal entry threshold, , is
 = 11 − 1
( − )
  (64)
Note that in this case  must be greater than  so the following inequality must hold  
2 ( −  )  This inequality implies extremely high values of the restructuring cost relative
to the cost of entry,  & 250 for the parameter values in our base case.
Appendix 2 — Variables used in the empirical analysis of industry-level merger
activity
Median market-to-book ratio and its standard deviation. Misvaluation theories (e.g., Rhodes-Kropf and
Viswanathan (2004) and Shleifer and Vishny (2003)) as well as neoclassical (shock-driven) theories of
mergers posit that merger activity is expected to be directly related to industry market-to-book ratios,
albeit for diﬀerent reasons.36 Furthermore, they predict a positive relation between merger activity
and the dispersion of market-to-book ratios within the industry (e.g., Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002)
and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004)).37 Therefore, we control for the industry-year median
market-to-book ratio and its standard deviation. Firm-level market-to-book ratio is calculated as the
36See Harford (2005) for a thorough discussion of the neoclassical and misvaluation-based theories of merger waves.
37On the other hand, Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2006) find that mergers are more likely between firms with similar
market-to-book ratios.
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ratio of the market value of the firm to the book value of its assets. The book value of assets is
the book value of equity plus liabilities. The book value of equity equals stockholder equity minus
preferred equity plus investment tax credit minus retirement benefit
Median three-year annual return. Misvaluation-based theories argues that past returns are ex-
pected to be positively related to overvaluation and to the resulting incentives to merge. The three-year
annual return is defined as the sum of thirty six monthly returns, obtained from CRSP.38
Median property, plant, and equipment to assets ratio. Larger fixed assets may result in higher
integration costs. Thus, we control for the proportion of tangible assets using the ratio of gross
industry-year median property, plant, and equipment to book assets.
Average commercial and industrial loans spread. Harford (2005) argues that mergers are more likely
to occur in periods of high credit availability. We follow Harford and use the spread between the average
commercial and industrial loans (C&I) rate and the Fed rate as an inverse proxy for credit availability.
We obtain the C&I rate spread from http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/e2/e2chart.htm.
Deregulation shocks. Demand shocks are but one of several that may aﬀect industry merger in-
tensity. Regulatory shocks may trigger unusual merger activity. To account for this possibility, we
identify a series of industry-specific deregulation events, in the spirit of Mitchell and Mulherin (1996)
and Harford (2005), and construct a deregulation window indicator, which equals one during the year
following the deregulation year and zero during other years.39
Other non-demand shocks. Harford (2005) argues that economic shocks to an industry operating
environment can be captured by the following factors: cash flow margin, asset turnover, research
and development expenses, capital expenditures, and return on assets. Since some of these measures
are highly correlated, we calculate industry-year median ratios for these five variables and define an
economic shock as the first principal component of the absolute annual changes in the characteristics’
median. The economic shock measure enters the regressions alone and interacted with a tight credit
dummy, which takes the value of one during years in which either the median industry market-to-book
ratio is below its time-series median or the C&I spread is above its median.
38Using market-adjusted returns instead of raw returns, or buy-and-hold returns instead of cumulative returns does
not aﬀect materially any of the results reported.
39To conserve space, we do not report these deregulation events here; they can be found in Table 3 in Harford (2005).
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Figure 1. Optimal merger thresholds as functions of the parameters of the demand
process
This figure presents the lower edge of the upper merger range,  (solid line), and lower merger threshold, 
(dashed line), as functions of the volatility of the stochastic process,  (left panel), and of its growth rate, 
(right panel), for the following set of input parameters:  = 1  = 001 (left panel)  = 02 (right panel)
 = 05  = 005  = 5  = 07
Figure 2. Optimal merger thresholds as functions of the entry cost
This figure presents the merger thresholds,  and , as functions of the entry cost,  The parameter values
(except for ) are set as in Figure 1.
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Figure 3. Optimal merger thresholds as functions of the product substitutability para-
meter
This figure presents the merger thresholds,  and , as functions of the utility function substitution parameter,
 The parameter values (except for ) are set as in Figure 1.
Figure 4. Optimal merger thresholds as functions of the restructuring cost
This figure presents the optimal merger thresholds,  and , as functions of the restructuring cost,  The
parameter values are set as in Figure 1. Region 1 corresponds to relatively low merger costs (and the resulting
U-shaped relation between the state of demand and merger intensity), while region 2 corresponds to relatively
high merger costs. Mergers at the lower threshold are precluded in region 2.
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Figure 5. Merger synergy and instantaneous profits
This figure presents the equilibrium instantaneous profit of the potential entrant as a function of the synergy
value. The parameter values are set as in Figure 1. The dashed line shows the profit of the potential entrant if
the incumbents have not merged,  , while the solid line shows its post-merger profit, .
Figure 6. Optimal merger thresholds as functions of the synergy value
This figure presents the optimal merger thresholds,  and , as functions of the value of the merger synergy
under the assumption of costless mergers. The parameter values are set as in Figure 1. While there are two
distinct thresholds for synergy values below 5.8%, the optimal strategy becomes to merge immediately for
greater synergy values.
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Figure 7. Optimal merger thresholds in oligopolistic industries as functions of the re-
structuring cost
This figure presents the optimal merger thresholds,  and , as functions of the restructuring cost, , in
industries with   2 incumbents firms. The parameter values are set as in Figure 1. Region 1 corresponds to
relatively low merger costs (and the resulting U-shaped relation between industry state and merger intensity),
while region 2 corresponds to relatively high merger costs. Mergers at the lower threshold are precluded in
region 2. The left panel displays the case of  = 3 while the right panel corresponds to  = 4
Figure 8. Returns to rivals around successful and unsuccessful mergers and the state of
demand
This figure presents the return to a firm that is part of an industry with three incumbents when a successful
merger is announced between its two product market rivals at the lower merging threshold,  (dashed line),
and the lower range of the upper merging range,  (solid line). The parameter values are as in Figure 1.
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Figure 9. Overall merger intensity and industry median sales growth - full sample
This figure presents the eﬀect of annual median industry sales growth on predicted annual industry merger
intensity, as well as the associated 95% confidence interval. The relation between sales growth and merger
intensity is estimated using semi-parametric regression in (28). In figure 9a the dependent variable is overall
(horizontal and non-horizontal) merger intensity. In figure 9b the dependent variable is horizontal merger in-
tensity. In figure 9c the dependent variable is non-horizontal merger intensity.
Figure 9a - Overall merger intensity
Figure 9b - Horizontal merger intensity Figure 9c - Non-horizontal merger intensity
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Figure 10. Overall merger intensity and industry median sales growth - subsamples based
on Herfindahl index and number of firms
This figure presents the eﬀect of annual median industry sales growth on predicted annual industry merger inten-
sity, as well as the associated 95% confidence interval for subsamples based on Herfindahl index and number of
firms. The relation between sales growth and merger intensity is estimated using semi-parametric regression in
(28). Figure 10a (10b) presents the relation for the sample of firms with below-median (above-median) Herfind-
ahl indexes. Figure 10c (10d) presents the relation for the sample of firms with below-median (above-median)
number of industry rivals.
Figure 10a - Low Herfindahl indexes Figure 10b - High Herfindahl indexes
Figure 10c - Low number of firms Figure 10d - High number of firms
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Figure A.1 Probability densities of unilateral merger and entry in the mixed strategies
equilibrium as functions of the state of the stochastic shock
The left panel presents the equilibrium probability density of unilateral merger attempt,  , in the region
 ∈ [ ), such that the entrant is indiﬀerent between waiting and entering. The right panel presents the
equilibrium probability density of unilateral entry, , in the region  ∈ [ ), such that the incumbents
are indiﬀerent between waiting and attempting a merger.
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Table 1. Merger intensities
Panel 1 presents the summary statistics of the number of mergers and merger intensities for all industry-years. The sample
period is 1981 - 2004. Industries are defined according to Fama and French (1997) classification. Merger intensity for all
(horizontal) mergers is defined as the sum of the values of all deals involving bidders from an industry divided by the sum of
previous-year-end market values of all firms in the industry. Panel 2 presents the time-series mean number of mergers and
merger intensities for five industries with the highest merger intensities. Panel 3 presents the annual mean merger intensities
for four years with the highest merger intensities.
Number of mergers per industry-year Industry-year merger intensity
All Horizontal All Horizontal
mergers mergers mergers mergers
Panel A – All industries and years
Min 0 0 0% 0%
Median 7 3 1.08% 0.35%
Max 391 229 70.51% 43.05%
Mean 17.08 9.86 2.45% 1.17%
Std 33.80 22.88 4.63% 2.50%
Panel B – Most active industries
3 – Candy and soda 1.42 1.17 5.45% 5.20%
11 – Health care 25.46 20.58 3.06% 2.69%
25 – Shipbuilding, railroad equipment 1.83 0.38 5.91% 0.52%
29 – Coal 0.58 0.17 7.07% 1.30%
45 – Banking 111.88 95.71 3.15% 2.69%
Panel C – Most active years
1996 31.55 18.65 4.25% 1.96%
1998 44.39 23.33 4.90% 2.98%
1999 34.10 19.51 4.25% 2.25%
2000 31.73 17.76 3.78% 2.18%
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Table 2. Sales growth and control variables
This table presents the summary statistics of variables that are expected to be related to merger intensity and their corre-
lation with sales growth. The sample period is 1981 - 2004. Industries are based on Fama-French (1997) definition. Sales
growth is the industry median ratio of the difference between sales in a given year and sales in the previous year to sales in
the previous year. Market-to-book is the industry median ratio of the sum of the market value of equity and the book value
of debt to the book value of assets. Std (market-to-book) is the annual industry-wide standard deviation of market-to-book.
Three-year RET is the three-year median industry return prior to the year of the observation, calculated as the sum of
thirty six monthly returns. PP&E-to-assets is the industry median ratio of PP&E to the book value of assets. C&I spread
is obtained from http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/e2/e2chart.htm. Deregulatory event is a dummy variable, taking
the value of one if an industry experiences a deregulation event in the previous year. The deregulation dummies are from
Harford (2005). See Section 3 for the definition of the economic shock index. Tight capital is a dummy variable taking the
value of one during years in which either the median industry market-to-book ratio is below its time-series median or the
C&I spread is above its median. Herfindahl index is the ratio of the sum of firms’ squared sales to the squared sum of their
sales. Herfindahl index and number of firms refers to Fama-French industries. The last column reports Pearson correlations
between each variable and sales growth. P-values are reported in brackets.
Min Median Max Mean Std. Correlation with sales growth
Sales growth -0.918 0.076 1.133 0.074 0.086
Market-to-book 0.755 1.212 4.663 1.314 0.410 0.190
[0.000]
Std (market-to-book) 0.074 1.261 4.338 1.360 0.793 0.106
[0.000]
Three-year RET -2.050 0.176 1.628 0.094 0.541 0.035
[0.230]
PP&E-to-assets 0.000 0.506 1.310 0.527 0.256 -0.127
[0.000]
C&I rate spread 0.800 1.530 2.500 1.558 0.360 -0.076
[0.010]
Deregulatory event 0 0 1 0.016 0.124 0.004
[0.898]
Economic shock index -2.127 -0.283 15.972 0.023 1.415 -0.016
[0.582]
Econ shock index * tight capital -2.127 0.000 9.069 -0.107 1.095 -0.030
[0.311]
Herfindahl index 0.013 0.089 0.896 0.138 0.132 0.002
[0.945]
Number of firms 2 92 962 127.260 130.880 0.080
[0.006]
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Table 3. Regressions of merger intensity - full sample
Panel A presents the estimates of panel random effects tobit regressions of industry-year merger intensity on annual industry
median sales growth, squared sales growth, and control variables. See Table 2 for variable definitions. In column 1 the
dependent variable is overall merger intensity. In column 2 (3) the dependent variable is horizontal (non-horizontal) merger
intensity. All models include industry and year fixed effects (not reported). P-values are reported in brackets. Panel B
presents selected statistics of the semi-parametric smoothing spline regressions of merger intensity on linear and non-linear
components of sales growth and control variables, estimated following Hastie and Tibshirani (1986). The statistics reported
include the coefficient on the sales growth linear component and the associated p-value, and the χ2 statistic of the significance
of the sales growth non-linear component. See Section 3.4 for the details about the semi-parametric estimation.
(1) (2) (3)
All Horizontal Non-horizontal
Panel A – Panel Regression Random Effects Tobit Model
Sales growth -0.0358* -0.0571*** 0.0133
[0.0938] [0.0000] [0.5629]
Sales growth squared 0.0859** 0.1348*** -0.1027
[0.0191] [0.0000] [0.1074]
Constant 0.0904*** 0.0393*** 0.0572**
[0.0003] [0.0050] [0.0155]
Market-to-book -0.0013 -0.0035 0.0042
[0.8567] [0.3834] [0.5369]
Std (Market-to-book) -0.0043 0.0001 -0.0055*
[0.1932] [0.9598] [0.0748]
Three-year Return 0.0058 0.0083*** -0.0004
[0.1075] [0.0001] [0.9061]
PP&E-to-assets -0.0704*** -0.0353*** -0.0601***
[0.0025] [0.0075] [0.0075]
C&I rate spread -0.0121 -0.0038 -0.0080
[0.1364] [0.4156] [0.2948]
Deregulatory event 0.0060 0.0077 -0.0041
[0.6060] [0.2223] [0.7051]
Economic shock index 0.0058*** 0.0045*** 0.0003
[0.0035] [0.0001] [0.8784]
Economic shock index * tight capital -0.0031 -0.0022* -0.0006
[0.1337] [0.0562] [0.7628]
Observations 1126 1126 1126
Log-likelihood 1639.3 1947.6 1548.2
Panel B – Semi-parametric Relation between Merger Intensity and Sales Growth
Linear component (Sales growth) -0.0161 -0.0276*** 0.0116
[0.4055] [0.0044] [0.4915]
Spline(Sales growth) χ2 8.7** 72.0*** 2.7
[0.0327] [0.0000] [0.4357]
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Table 4. Regressions of merger intensity - subsamples
Panel A presents the estimates of panel random effects tobit regressions of industry-year horizontal merger intensity on annual
industry median sales growth, squared sales growth, and control variables. See Table 2 for variable definitions. Column 1
(2) present the results of the models estimated using the sample of industries with below-median (above-median) Herfindahl
index. Column 3 (4) present the results of the model estimated using the sample of industries with below-median (above-
median) number of firms.All models include industry and year fixed effects (not reported). P-values are reported in brackets.
Panel B presents selected statistics of the semi-parametric smoothing spline regressions of merger intensity on linear and
non-linear components of sales growth and control variables, estimated following Hastie and Tibshirani (1986). The statistics
reported include the coefficient on the sales growth linear component and the associated p-value, and the χ2 statistic of the
significance of the sales growth non-linear component. See Section 3.4 for the details about the semi-parametric estimation.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low Herfindahl High Herfidahl Low # Firms High # Firms
Panel A – Panel Regression Random Effects Tobit Model
Sales growth 0.0349* -0.0952*** -0.0817*** 0.0148
[0.0725] [0.0000] [0.0001] [0.4140]
Sales growth squared -0.0627 0.1498*** 0.1593*** 0.0024
[0.3359] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.9681]
Constant 0.0483*** 0.0111 0.0231 0.0321***
[0.0001] [0.6150] [0.3940] [0.0042]
Market-to-book -0.0046 -0.0010 -0.0016 0.0006
[0.3778] [0.8781] [0.8560] [0.8754]
Std (Market-to-book) -0.0040 0.0015 0.0012 -0.0043*
[0.1214] [0.5987] [0.7051] [0.0645]
Three-year Return 0.0045 0.0107*** 0.0149*** 0.0028
[0.1043] [0.0016] [0.0001] [0.2132]
PP&E-to-assets -0.0392** -0.0314 -0.0447* -0.0329*
[0.0331] [0.1325] [0.0532] [0.0535]
C&I rate spread -0.0179*** 0.0092 0.0007 -0.0109**
[0.0003] [0.2629] [0.9438] [0.0223]
Deregulatory event 0.0044 0.0181 0.0139 0.0059
[0.4088] [0.2895] [0.6058] [0.1912]
Economic shock index 0.0031** 0.0058*** 0.0065*** 0.0026**
[0.0278] [0.0019] [0.0026] [0.0399]
Economic shock index * tight capital -0.0015 -0.0025 -0.0008 -0.0009
Observations 561 565 558 568
Log-likelihood 1347.4 692.7 610.0 1472.9
Panel B – Semi-parametric Relation between Merger Intensity and Sales Growth
Linear component (Sales growth) 0.0200 -0.0529*** -0.043*** 0.0118
[0.1908] [0.0001] [0.0023] [0.4061]
Spline(Sales growth) χ2 2.3 53.3*** 49.2*** 6.3*
[0.5080] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0939]
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